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1. Introduction
The reform of the United Nations (UN) is a popular buzz phrase within and without the United 
Nations. Officials of the UN, representatives of State members of the UN, relevant NGOs and 
other members of the civil society, as well as interested individuals are quite vociferous on the 
need to reform the UN and have proffered various suggestions on how this should be done.  
Malloch Brown, a former UN Deputy Secretary-General pointed out that: 
“UN reform is about politics in the sense that it is a response to the frustration of 
governments and the UN’s other stakeholders with the organization’s capacity to
get results. People wanted more from the UN. Unable to deliver, the managers
kept on trying to fix the machine. It became an occupational obsession.” 1
While this is so, I think it is important to note that the whole idea of UN reforms could be 
seen from two broad perspectives. In one sense, the whole debate on UN reform could be 
seen from the perspective that the organization was an imperfect organization from the 
onset and has to be radically overhauled to correct perceived blunders made by its initiators. 
In another sense, perhaps a more optimistic note, it may be argued that the talk about 
reform by States and other stakeholders, rather than an abandonment of the UN project, is a 
good sign. This could be said to be an affirmation that the UN is still regarded as an 
important tool in international relations and that it continues to play a crucial and relevant 
role. In the latter sense, the idea of reform is simply to make this significant organization 
1 Mark Malloch Brown, “The John W. Holmes Lecture: Can the UN Be Reformed?”, (2008) 14(1) Global 
Governance, pp.1-12 
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more effective to tackle new challenges and situations that have arisen since it was set up in 
1945.2
Undoubtedly, there is nothing new about the reform agenda of the UN. As far back as 1965 
the need to reform the UN led to the increase of the membership of the Security Council 
from the original membership of 11 to the present number of 15. However, it would appear 
that since the end of the Cold war there has been an increase in the calls for reforms of the 
UN. There have been loads and loads of reform proposals and it would be an impossible 
task to identify and address all the proposals in a lecture of this nature. Fortunately, my remit 
for this evening is much simpler – I have been asked to mainly address certain proposals 
contained in a 112-page booklet I have been given which is titled – Reform Proposals: For a 
Democratic United Nations and the Rule of Law (a publication produced by the Dag 
Hammarskjold Foundation in cooperation with UNA Sweden) This booklet is a compilation of 
reform proposals by Erskine Barton Childers and some others and was compiled by Hanne 
Christensen. Even at that, I must point out that this booklet covers a wide-range of proposals 
and therefore we simply cannot, during our obviously limited time here today, cover all the 
proposals. I would therefore focus on some of the proposals in the booklet and a few other 
proposals that I believe would be of interest. 
2. Membership 
Perhaps, I should start off by looking at the membership of the UN. Although, there are no 
explicit proposals in the booklet on the reform of the membership of the UN, I have chosen 
to touch on this for two reasons. First, the booklet makes constant reference to roles that 
NGOs may play in some of the proposals that have been advocated. Second, because we 
are located in Wales and there have been suggestions in certain quarters about the 
possibility of Wales’ membership of the UN. For e.g., Plaid Cymru (the Party of Wales) had 
at one time included as one of its aims the following: “To promote Wales's contribution to the 
global community and to attain membership of the United Nations.”3
Membership is a particular important issue, since the UN, with a current membership of 193 
States from the different regions of the world, representing diverse cultures, values and 
2 See Justin Morris, “UN Security Council Reform: A Counsel for the 21st Century”, (2000) 31 Security 
Dialogue, pp.265-277. See for instance, the Secretary-General’s Report, Renewing the United Nations: A 
Programme for Reform, A/51/950 of 14 July 1997 and  the Secretary-General’s Report, Strengthening the 
United Nations: an agenda for further change, A/57/387 of 9 September 2002 
3 http://www.partyofwales.org/our-history/
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religions, is undoubtedly the largest intergovernmental organization in the world. Article 4 of 
the United Nations Charter states: 
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the
judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be
effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the Security Council.
As we would note the current membership of the UN is limited to only ‘peace-loving States.’
Since, the end of the 2nd World War it would appear that all States are now regarded as
‘peace-loving’ for the purposes of admission to the UN. It really does not matter how big or
small such a State is. There are States on both sides of the spectrum – big ones, such as
China and small ones, as Nauru. For Wales to be considered for membership of the UN we
need to examine the question - Is Wales a State under International Law? The relevant
provision to start off from is the Montevideo Convention 1933, originally a Convention
between some Latin American States, which over the years has been accepted as reflecting
Customary International Law.4 Article 1 of the Convention states that the criteria for
Statehood is: permanent population, defined territory, government and capacity to enter into
legal relations with other States (which connotes independence and sovereignty). Wales
may clearly satisfy the first two criteria, and arguably may also be said to have a
government, the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG), though the WAG has rather limited
powers. However, it certainly does not satisfy the last requirement since it is an integral part
of the UK. Devolution powers certainly does not give Wales the status of an independent
Sovereign State and it has not at any time since the establishment of the UN been
recognized by other States as such. Although, the strict interpretation of Article 4 of the
Charter requires an entity to qualify as a State to be a member of the UN, there are
nonetheless historical precedents where certain entities not technically States were admitted
as members due to simple political exigencies. What I have in mind is the admission of
Ukraine and Byelorussia (now Belarus) into membership at time of the establishment of the
UN, when they could not strictly speaking be regarded as States because they were an
integral part of the then USSR. This was done as a result of diplomatic horse trading
between the bipolar powers – the USA and USSR. Using these precedents it is arguable
that though Wales is not a State, technically it may be admitted to UN membership if such
4 Edwin Egede and Peter Sutch, The Politics of International Law and International Justice, ( Edinburgh
University Press, 2013), p.101
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membership is recommended by the Security Council and accepted by the General 
Assembly. However, it is doubtful if, in reality, this is likely a possibility because any such 
application is not likely to have the support of the P-5 members, a number of them who are 
unlikely to want to encourage such precedent, in view of the likely impact this may have on 
internal separatist movements within their borders. It also unlikely that the UK itself would 
support such application which in itself is contrary to the provisions of the Charter on 
membership and not in line with its national interest of keeping the UK as one. 
The UN Charter obviously excludes international organizations, NGOs and other non-State 
entities from the membership of the UN. The question really is should the status quo of 
limiting UN membership to only States be retained in an international community composed 
not only by States, but also non-State actors. In a 1995 UN Declaration during the fiftieth 
anniversary of the UN, the General Assembly stated: 
“We recognize that our common work will be the more successful if it is 
supported by all concerned actors of the international community, including non-
governmental organizations, multilateral financial institutions, regional 
organizations and all actors of the civil society.” 5
As we would recall, the United Nations was created in 1945 at a time where the focus was 
more on States. Things have since changed. While States still remain the main actors, there 
are certain non-state actors, such as international organisations and NGOs, which 
increasingly are playing vital roles in international politics. Should the membership of the UN 
be expanded to include such non-state actors? While a few modern international 
organisations actually permit other international organisations to be part of their membership 
(for e.g. the International Seabed Authority established under the Law of the Sea Convention 
1982), NGOs cannot be members of the standard international organisation because they 
cannot be parties to treaties. In any event, to have non-State actors as part of the UN 
membership would, in my view, complicate things. At present the UN has a huge 
membership of 193 States and to add non-State actors to this would make it unwieldy and 
unmanageable. This would adversely affect the decision-making of the UN. I must say 
however that I support the present arrangement whereby States are the only members of 
the UN, and non-State actors, as NGOs, are merely given consultative status through 
bodies, such as the ECOSOC, which allows them to indirectly influence the UN and 
contribute to its progress.  
5 Para. 17, http://www.un.org/UN50/dec.htm
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Further, I quite like the idea proposed in the booklet of some sort of consortium of NGOs 
with an interest in the UN, to provide such NGOs with a unified vehicle to seek to indirectly 
influence the direction of the UN (see pp.29-30 of the booklet).  
2. General Assembly
The General Assembly is the most democratic organ of the UN with every State member 
being part of this plenary body. All States no matter how big or small have one vote a 
reflection of equality of States, an attribute of State Sovereignty (See Articles 2 [1] and 18[1] 
of the Charter) . 
A. One of the proposals for reform in the booklet is the establishment of a sort of
Parliamentary Assembly to function alongside the General Assembly. While membership
of the General Assembly would be restricted to governments of member States as it
presently operates, it is proposed that the so-called Parliamentary Assembly would be
the 'voice global public opinion' (p.16 of the booklet). The members of the Parliamentary
Assembly under this proposal would be elected by the world population as a whole.
Although, this proposal appears to be good on paper, it is not, in my view, realistic. First,
it appears to act on the assumption that all members of the UN are democratic States
committed to promoting democratic values, which is certainly not the case. How would
such election be conducted in non-democratic States? Second, it would be a logistic
nightmare and very expensive to attempt to conduct an election for the world. Who
would organise the elections - each of the member States of the UN, regional bodies or
the UN itself? The situation in the EU where the European Parliament is elected must
be distinguished from that of the UN. For one with the EU the member States share the
similar democratic values as this is one of the core requirements for membership
(Articles 2 and 49 of the Lisbon Treaty). Unfortunately, this is not so with the UN.
B. The proposals in the booklet appear in different places to emphasise on the need to
more effectively use of the International Court of Justice advisory opinion jurisdiction.
For instance, it proposes that the General Assembly should request the ICJ to provide
an advisory opinion on whether Article 12(1) of the Charter (which prohibits the General
Assembly from making any recommendations with regard to any dispute or situation that
the Security Council is handling unless the latter so requests) takes precedence over
that of Article 96(1)(which states that the General Assembly or the Security Council may
request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on any legal question)(see pp.12-13). I am
not really clear on aim of such request for an ICJ advisory opinion on this issue. Anyway
it suffices to say that the impact of an ICJ advisory opinion should not be exaggerated.
While such advisory opinion would have some weight as an authoritative opinion on the
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position of international law on an issue it certainly cannot amend the clear effect of the 
Charter and such advisory opinions are not legally binding. 
C. Another proposal is that the General Assembly should condemn purchase and so-called
extortion of votes in the General Assembly or Security by powerful States threatening for
instance to cut aid, end debt relief or support the granting of loans by the World Bank to
less powerful States. While it may be immoral for powerful States to use political and
economic influence to pressurise other States to vote in support of the former States
position in the General Assembly, Security Council and organs of the UN there is
nothing illegal under international law about this. The General Assembly and Security
Council, which are political bodies, are susceptible to situations whereby powerful States
put pressure on less powerful States. Such so-called '[a]ttempts at purchase and
extortion of votes' cannot be brought before the ICJ because it is not a legal issue, but
merely a political one. See chapter II of the Statute of the ICJ. Further, the proposal
requires that such attempts at purchase and extortion of votes should be ‘indictable’ at
the ICJ and made public to the world population. First, I must point out that the ICJ
cannot indict States because it is not a Criminal Court. Second, States under
international law cannot be indicted for crimes, only individuals can. In the Nuremberg
trial, the tribunal emphasised that States do not commit crimes; individuals do.6 The
option that is perhaps feasible is the proposed NGO watch list referred to name and
shame States involved in such 'purchase and ex torsion' of votes. This would perhaps
cause some of these States, at least, to desist from this due to the pressure of public
opinion pressure.
3. Selecting the Secretary-General
The Secretary-General is to be appointed by the General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council. (See Article 97 of the UN Charter). Technically, the 
proposal in the booklet is right that the General Assembly may reject the candidate 
recommended by the Security Council (p.18). However, it must be noted that the General 
Assembly cannot make the appointment without the Security Council. See in relation to the 
similar situation with regard to the admission of new members to the UN, the ICJ advisory 
opinion in the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the 
United Nations,7  where the ICJ pointed out that the General Assembly could not admit a 
State to membership without the recommendation of the Security Council. 
6 See Philippe Kirsch, “Applying the Principles of Nuremberg in the International Criminal Court”, (2007) 6
Washington University Global Studies Review, pp.501- 509 at 502
7 [1950] ICJ Rep. 4
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Further, the proposal appears to regard the S-G is the leader of the UN (see p.19). However, 
this does not really reflect the role of S-G as stated by the Charter. The S-G is more of an 
administrative head of the UN and certainly not the leader of the Organisation. The Charter 
states that the SG is 'the chief administrative officer of the Organisation.' (See Article 97 of 
UN Charter). Although, the S-G has multiple roles as an impartial arbitrator, a diplomat, 
spokesman etc. that led Trygve Lie the 1st S-G to describe it as '[t]he most impossible job on 
this earth', he is certainly not the leader of the UN. In my view, the real political leaders of the 
UN are the P-5 members of the Security Council, who have immense powers, notably the 
veto power, which enables them to determine the direction of the UN. 
Further, the proposal is right that the General Assembly can adopt new rules on the search, 
selection and recommendation of the S-G. Although, the Charter does not go into specific 
details on this, the General Assembly had as far back as 1946 adopted Resolution 11(1) 
dealing with terms of appointment of the S-G. In this Resolution states that the S-G would 
serve for a renewal 5-year term. Over the years the practice has been for each S-G to serve 
a maximum of two terms (i.e. ten years). The proposal of a single term of 7 years in my view 
would be helpful in having a more independent S-G. With the current two term structure S-
Gs who are too independent stand the risk of not being reappointed. An e.g. that readily 
comes to mind is S-G Boutros Boutros Ghali who was not reappointed for a second term 
because one of the P-5 vetoed his reappointment. It is said that this was because the P-5 
member felt he was too independent during his first term.  
Further, in relation to the suggestion in the booklet that the Security Council should submit 
three names to the General Assembly instead of one (p.19), it must be mentioned that the 
practice of submitting just one candidate is based on the 1946 General Assembly resolution. 
The General Assembly in this resolution indicated that it preferred that the Security Council 
recommends only one candidate to avoid a polarising debate in the General Assembly. 
Clearly such debate would weaken the legitimacy of any candidate who is eventually 
appointed. Further, I doubt that involving a wide range of actors, such as the NGO 
community and interested citizens, in the appointment process of the S-G, as put forward in 
the booklet, would be helpful(p.19). From the way the UN Charter is framed what is needed 
is a person of competence who the Security Council, especially the P-5 members, and the 
General Assembly are able and happy to work with, and not necessarily a person popular 
with NGOs and the so-called ‘citizens of the world.’ I do not see that there have been any 
major problems with public support of the S-G due to the non-involvement of NGOs and 
interested citizens in the appointment of the S-G.
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I wholeheartedly agree with the proposal that the world is long overdue for a female S-G 
(p.20). The past 8 S-Gs have all been men. Although, the 1946 resolution states the 
candidate must be 'a man of eminence and high attainment'(Article 1) there is nothing under 
the Charter to suggest that this position should be limited to men. Limiting the post of S-G to 
only men would be contrary to one of the UN's core purpose of promoting and protecting 
human rights - prohibition of discrimination (see Article 1(3) and Article 8 of the Charter.   
Article 1(3) 
To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; 
Article 8 
The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and 
women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its 
principal and subsidiary organs. 
4. Security Council
The Security Council, though listed in the UN Charter as the second principal organ is 
undoubtedly the most powerful of the six principal organs of the UN.8 It has the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, with binding powers to 
carry out this crucial role and may utilize non-military or military measures to do so.9 As far as 
Kofi Annan, the erstwhile S-G of the UN, was concerned: “no reform of the United Nations 
would be complete without reform of the Security Council.” 10  This organ was originally 
composed of eleven States, but this has since been increased to fifteen States.11 It is made 
up of five permanent members (P-5), who by virtue of the historical incidence of being the 
victorious powers at the end of the Second World War allotted to themselves this privileged 
position, 12  as well as ten non-permanent members who are elected for a term of two 
years.13The P-5 have immense powers to veto decisions of the Council on substantive 
matters. Although, the Charter does not specifically designate this power as the ‘veto’ power 
the provision of Article 27(3) of the Charter has that practical effect. Article 27(3) states that:  
8 Art.7 of the Charter lists the principal organs in the following order: The General Assembly, the Security 
Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice and Secretariat. 
9 See Arts. 24, 25 and Chapter VII of the Charter 
10 Para.169 of the A/59/2005 
11 Art.23 of the Charter 
12 The five permanent members are China, France, Russia (successor to the USSR), the UK and the USA.  
13 Art.23 of the Charter 
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“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters [Non-procedural matters] 
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine Members including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI 
[Pacific Settlement of Disputes], and under paragraph 3 of Article 52[regional 
arrangements for pacific settlement of disputes], a party to a dispute shall abstain 
from voting.”
The debate on the reform of the Security Council has centered on three main areas – the veto, 
composition and improving working methods.  
A. Veto 
The issue of the veto of the P-5 of the UNSC, undoubtedly a significant issue in international 
law and international relations, has generated a lot of polemical arguments both for and 
against the retention of this power. Some have asked for the veto powers to be reformed to 
make the UNSC more effective. Various proposals have been made to reform the veto power. 
For instance, as far back as the San Francisco Conference Australia had proposed the waiving 
of the veto power in all proceedings arising under Chapter VI of the Charter i.e. pacific 
settlement of disputes. 14 This proposal was not accepted, however Article 27 of the Charter 
requires that in decisions under Chapter VI a party to the dispute shall abstain from voting. 
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1998 proposed that the veto should be curtailed with a 
view to its elimination, and as a first step that the veto power should only apply to enforcement 
actions taken under Chapter VII.15  Others, like the African Union, proposed the restriction on 
single P-5 member veto by stating that a veto should only prevent the Security Council from 
acting if cast by at least two or more P-5 members.16 However, the constraint of Article 108 
limits the extent of reform of the veto power that could realistically be achieved. It is unlikely 
that the P-5 members would consent to any reform of this immense power that would either 
withdraw this privileged power or water it down. The High Level Panel (HLP) report 2004 
acknowledged this much by stating that they see no practical way of changing the existing 
members’ veto power though in their view the veto power has “anachronistic character that is 
unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic age.”17 In what appeared to be an 
indication of the Panel’s sense of helplessness in this regard they urged that the veto power 
14 Wouters and Ruys, “Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century,” at p.21, 
http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/WP78e.pdf
15 Ibid. See also Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and 
Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, General 
Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No.47 (A/53/47), p.34, 
http://www.undemocracy.com/A-53-47.pdf
16 Wouters and Ruys, op.cit. at p.22 
17 HLP Report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, para.256 
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should be limited to matters where the vital interests are genuinely at stake.18 However, they 
were not clear on they meant by ‘vital interests’. Who determines whether or not the vital 
interests are genuinely at stake? Further, the HLP pleaded rather helplessly with each 
individual P-5 member, in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from using 
the veto in the cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses.19 They however 
recommended that under any reform expanding the composition of the Security Council the 
veto power should not be extended to the new members. Basically this advocates for 
inequality as between P-5 members and other permanent members that may be selected in 
an expanded Security Council.20 In the view of the African Union (AU), such inequality would 
be contrary to “common justice.” Therefore, the AU while opposing the veto in principle 
advocated that it should be available also to new permanent members.21
There is also a proposal in the booklet that the Security Council should voluntarily relinquish 
their veto in respect of the appointment of the S-G and amendments of the Charter (p.36). 
This in my view is not likely to happen as the veto is a power-tool used by the P-5 members 
to secure what they perceive to be their national interest. It may be argued that though the 
veto power is sometimes used immorally, it is an important tool that keeps the P-5 members 
within the UN and probably explains the longevity of the UN. Without the veto would the P-5 
members remain in the UN? 
The HLP also recommended the introduction of a system of indicative voting whereby 
members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed 
action. In this indicative vote, a ‘no’ vote by a P-5 member would not be regarded as a veto. 
Thereafter, a second formal vote would be held where the ‘no’ vote of such P-5 member would 
then be regarded as a veto. The Panel was of the view that such indicative voting system 
would increase accountability of the veto function.22 The idea appears to be that an indicative 
‘no’ vote would leave a P-5 member open to pressure from public opinion that would 
embarrass them to withdraw a ‘no’ vote which is against public opinion.23 It is not clear upon 
what basis the Panel took the opinion that such indicative vote would make the veto system 




21See African Union, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, “The
Ezulwini Consensus,” http://www.safpi.org/publications/common-african-position-proposed-reform-united-
nations-ezulwini-consensus
22 HLP Report, para.257 
23 Yehuda Blum, “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform” (2005)99(3) American Journal of International
Law, pp.632-649 at 643-644
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would dissuade a P-5 member, especially those that are non-democratic States, from pursuing 
a veto that is unpopular so long as the leadership of such P-5 member are of the view that it 
is in their national interest to do so.  
B. Composition 
Due to the exponential growth of the UN to the current membership of 193, there have been 
calls for the expansion of the Security Council from its current number. This is more so as 
some regions of the world, for e.g. Africa and Latin America, are not represented amongst 
the P-5.24 Further,  it was felt that since the “Security Council had originally been conceived 
and designed as a body encapsulating, and effectively institutionalizing, the global balance 
of power,”25 there was a need for a  reformed Security Council that would reflect the current 
power configuration, which has changed dramatically since 1945 when the Charter was 
adopted. However, although virtually everyone agrees that the composition of the Security 
Council should be reformed there is no agreement on how this should be done. Who should 
for instance be brought in as additional permanent members? Should there even be 
additional permanent members? How can the Security Council be reformed to make it more 
representative without making it too large and thereby affect adversely its effectiveness? 
C Improving working methods  
The HLP Report, the In Larger Freedom Report and the 2005 World Summit were all united 
on the need to improve the working methods of the Security Council in order to promote 
transparency and accountability, a reform that could be embarked upon without the need to 
amend the Charter.26 Quite a bit of work has been done in this regard. The Security Council 
now has annual debates on certain matters to improve dialogue between the Security Council 
members and other member States of the UN. Since 2010 debates have become an annual 
practice (previously, only two such debates were held: in 1994 and 2008). It seeks to make 
more effective use of public meetings; maintaining regular communication with the 
Peacebuilding Commission and the chairs of its country-specific configurations; expanding 
consultation and cooperation with relevant regional and sub-regional organizations.27
D. Charter Sequence to Chapter VII 
24 The African and Latin America and Caribbean Grouping are not represented amongst the P-5. 
25 See Morris, “UN Security Council Reform: A Counsel for the 21st Century”, op.cit. at p.266. 
26 Para.21 of Secretary-General’s Report, Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change, 
A/57/387 of 9 September 2002. Para.258 of HLP Report, Para.168 of In Larger Freedom Report and Para.154 of 
World Summit outcome document. 
27 See Security Council Working Methods, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-
10/security_council_working_methods.php
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The booklet proposes that the Security Council should first and foremost have recourse to 
peaceful redress under Chapter VI before using enforcement measures under Chapter VII, 
such as sanctions, and as a last resort the use of military force (p.34). Ideally this may be 
the best way to go and the Security Council does try to promote peaceful settlement in 
appropriate cases. However there is no doubt that in cases of extreme emergency involving 
a massive loss of human lives it would be preferable for the Security Council to act promptly 
under Chapter VII, and in appropriate cases to use military force even if it is as a first resort. 
I think the sequence of Chapter VI before Chapter VII may be the general rule, but we have 
to recognize that in extreme and justifiable situations the Security Council must and should 
have the discretion to depart from any such sequence. 
E. Should the Security Council have a Standing Army and Police Force? 
Clearly some kind of standing military and police force would improve the efficiency of the 
UN in terms of deployment (See pp.40-41 and 44 of the booklet). However, I am rather 
skeptical about the practicality of this. The UN is not a State so cannot raise a Standing 
military or police force without the contribution of States. Would the big States that actually 
have a well-equipped military and police force be willing to commit their personnel to being 
permanently assigned to the UN? What about the cost of maintaining this standing military 
and police force? Would it not be too expensive to maintain such standing military? Who 
would bear the cost? Would this not imply that the UN is some sort of World government? 
Mr. Morrison, the Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, in his 
incisive article, raises, amongst other things, the following questions to illustrate the 
difficulties of having a Standing UN force:28
 Would the army have to be racially and geographically balanced? 
 Who would exercise command control – the UN Secretary-General? The Security 
Council? The Military Staff Committee? 
 Where would the troops have their base? Would it be centralised or decentralised? 
 How would the troops be paid? 
 Who would train the troops? 
Would States be ready to commit long term to such standing army? I very much doubt this 
because of the cost, especially with pressing domestic issues that would require such scarce 
resources.  Even, if the States are willing and able to provide resources to support such 
28 Alex Morrison, “The Fiction of a UN Standing Army”, (1994) 18 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, pp.83-96
at 95
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standing army their deployment would still require Security Council authorization and of 
course this would still be subject to P-5 politics.   
It has also been proposed in certain other quarters of the possibility that UN peace-keeping 
operations may be outsourced to Private Military Companies (PMCs).29 Some arguments in 
favour are availability and relatively lower costs. However, arguments against in my view are 
quite weighty – Are PMCs not just merely ‘corporate mercenaries’ (Ballesteros, former UN 
Rapporteur on Mercenaries) since they are motivated primarily by profit? Do they have the 
ability to operate within basic principles of UN Peacekeeping? Are they really accountable?
At least regular military and police force, in spite of shortcomings that have resulted in some
scandals can be held accountable by their home State.30
5. Trusteeship Council 
The Trusteeship Council, another principal organ of the UN, completed its assignment in 1994 
when the last trust territory, Palau, gained independence.31 Since then the issue has been 
what to do with this organ. Should it be deleted from the UN Charter as a principal organ or 
should it be given another remit? As far as the HLP Panel was concerned, the provisions of 
the Charter dealing with the Trusteeship Council should be deleted since it had completed its 
assignment of decolonization. The Panel appeared to be of the view that the deletion of the 
Trusteeship Council from the Charter would be an indication that the UN has turned its “back
on any attempt to return to the mentalities and forms of colonialism.”32 They advocated, that 
the Human Rights Council (HRC) should eventual replace the Trusteeship Council as a 
principal organ.33 The deletion of the Trusteeship Council from the UN Charter was endorsed 
by the 2005 World summit34and this appears to be implicit in the In Larger Freedom report.35
It should be noted, however that previously in July 1997 the UN Secretary-General had 
29 See Oldrich Bures, “Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option? (2005) 12(4) 
International Peacekeeping, pp.533-546 and Daphné Richemond, “The New Peacekeepers? Private Military 
Corporations and the Future of Peacekeeping Operations”, ESIL Working Agora Series, December 2007, 
http://www.esil-sedi.eu/fichiers/en/Agora_Richemond_358.pdf
3030 See Lindsey Cameron, “Private Military Companies: their status under International Humanitarian Law and
its impact on their regulation”, (2006) 88(863) International Review of the Red Cross, pp.573-598
31 Trusteeship Council Res.2199 (LXI) (May 25, 1994). On the Trusteeship Council, see Chapter XIII of the UN 
Charter, Ralph Wilde, “Trusteeship Council” in Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
on the United Nations, op.cit, pp.149-159 and Egede and Sutch, The Politics of International Law and 




35 Paras.165 and 166
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proposed in his report to the General Assembly – Renewing the UN: A programme for reform
– that the Trusteeship Council: 
“…be reconstituted as the forum through which Member States exercise their 
collective trusteeship for the integrity of the global environment and common 
areas such as the oceans, atmosphere and outer space. At the same time, it 
should serve to link the United Nations and civil society in addressing these 
areas of global concern, which require the active contribution of public, private 
and voluntary sectors.”36
This proposal did not receive an enthusiastic response from the member States.37  It is not 
clear how this proposal would be feasible in the case of global commons that already have an 
institutional framework by which States are able to exercise their collective trusteeship. For 
instance, in respect of the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction (the Area), which together with the resources therein, are the common 
heritage of mankind, there is a comprehensive institutional framework. Here the International 
Seabed Authority (ISA) acts as a type of trustee on behalf of the States Parties to the Law of 
the Sea Convention (LOSC) 1982.38 It is difficult to understand how the conventional role of 
the ISA would be reconciled with that of the Trusteeship Council if such proposal were 
accepted. Will it be the Trusteeship Council or the ISA that would act in respect of the Area? 
This would certainly raise complex issues. Some others have suggested that the Trusteeship 
Council be given a new remit as a “modern international clearing house for self-
determination.”39 This is an interesting proposal, as it would amount to a ‘collectivization’ of 
the whole process of recognition of entities that seek to be admitted as States members of the 
international community and perhaps achieve some kind of certainty in the recognition 
process. It is not certain what the response of States have been to this proposal. Another 
suggestion is that the Trusteeship Council could be used to provide support and to administer 
‘failed States.’ However, in view of the fact that a number of such States are located in Africa, 
some have argued that this would amount to reintroducing “benign colonialism” in parts of 
Africa.40
6. Financing the UN 
An international Organization requires proper funding to effectively carry out its aims and 
objectives (See pp.59-63 of the booklet). Usually the financing of an international organization, 
including the UN, is derived mainly from the contributions of members. There is an important 
36 Para.85 of A/51/950 of 14 July 1997. 
37 Wilde, “Trusteeship Council”, op.cit.at p.156 
38 Arts.1 (1), 136 and 137(2) of the LOSC 1982. 
39 Carolyn L. Wilson, “Changing the Charter: The United Nations Prepares for the Twenty-first Century.”(1996)
90(1) The American Journal of International Law, p.115 at 122. 
40 Wilde, “Trusteeship Council”, op.cit.at pp.155-156 
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nexus between financing of an international organization and influence. A State that is a major 
contributor of finance to an international organization may seek to have significant influence 
in the decision-making of such organization. This is not unusual, it is just the natural course of 
things – I believe the idiom is: ‘He who pays the piper dictates the tune’. I am not too sure, as 
stated in the proposal, if introducing a limit on contributions would be the answer in the UN. 
The question is if other States members would be able or willing to absorb the difference, 
especially with competing domestic issues that require such scarce finances. The only way to 
reduce the influence of major contributor States is to look for alternative sources of income. 
Taxation in any form, in my view, is not likely to work. The UN is not a State and would have 
to rely on States Members to impose taxes. I doubt that member States would support this. 
Further, it is doubtful that a large number of individuals in member States who are currently 
paying what they regard as high domestic taxes would be happy to pay additional taxes to the 
UN. Another alternative source of funding is voluntary giving - perhaps through using, amongst 
other things, an online giving facility - by individuals and other non-State actors that support 
the aims and objectives of the UN. Would this raise a substantial amount of money to provide 
an alternate source of funds that would give the UN financially autonomy? It is very unlikely. 
It is doubtful that there would be that many Ted Turner type of donations.41 However, this may 
bring in some non-State contribution income for the UN, and perhaps in some ways serve as 
a gauge for the UN to determine how much non-State actors are actually engaged with the 
UN. Arguable a significant financial contribution by non-State actors to the UN would be an 
indication of support for the UN going beyond just the States.     
7. UN Charter – To Amend or not to Amend?  
In exploring these initiatives, it is important to point out that there are two broad types of reform 
initiatives – one that necessarily involves amending the constituent instruments and that, 
which could be done without such amendment. Obviously, the former initiatives are usually 
more difficult to achieve because of the sometimes cumbersome amendment processes as 
contained in Article 108 of the UN Charter which states: 
“Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the 
United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the 
members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United 
Nations, including all the permanent Members of the Security Council.”42
41 In September 1997 Ted Turner announced a $1 billion dollar donation to the UN to aid their work, especially
in areas such as the fight against global poverty, http://edition.cnn.com/US/9709/18/turner.gift/
42 See also Art.109 
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The requirement that P-5 members concur to any amendment of the Charter makes reform of 
the UN involving the amendment of the Charter rather difficult to achieve. It has therefore been 
advocated that perhaps the focus of UN reforms should be that which would not necessarily 
entail Charter amendment.43 While this may be a convenient way to obtain a more speedy 
reform of the UN system, to address the fundamental issues that affect the legitimacy of the 
UN there would be a need to amend the Charter. An almost impossible task if such 
amendment is not regarded by the P-5 members as aligning with their interest. 
8. Conclusion  
There has certainly not been a shortage of reform initiatives in respect of the UN.  Reports 
and proposals abound in respect of UN reform. While some of the reforms have been adopted 
and implemented, a number of the reform initiatives remain ‘lost’ in the various report 
documents and archives. The bottom line is that unless there is political will on the part of the 
member States of the UN, notably the P-5 States, it is unlikely that substantial far-reaching 
reforms to make the UN more effective in the 21st century would be achieved. Although a 
number of the UN member States appear to subliminally accept the need for far-reaching 
reforms to make these institutions ‘fit for purpose’ for the 21st century, the lack of political will, 
the desire to protect selfish national interests and the feeling of not wanting to ‘rock the boat,’
would always result in the apathy of States in taking real action in achieving comprehensive 
and drastic reforms. 
43 See Louis Sohn, “Important Improvements in the Functioning of the Principal Organs of the United Nations 
that can be made without Charter Revision”, (1997) 91 American Journal of International Law, pp.652-662 and 
Michael Reisman, “Amending the UN Charter: The Art of the Feasible,” (1994) 88 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings,pp.108-115 
